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This study investigates the informational eﬀects of large transactions,
or Block Trades (BT), in the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). In the
open market period, this topic was not facilitated in the SSE as it was in
other markets until 1998. The SSE thus provides a special environment for
analysing the information transmission of these speciﬁc transactions.
It is assumed that information can be better reﬂected by changes
in true asset value, proxied by the midpoint of bid-ask best quotes.
Therefore, we will look at changing true asset value orders instead of
trades.
Three diﬀerent eﬀects are studied around BTs: price, liquidity and
information transmission. To capture them, three diﬀerent endogenous
variables are considered: true asset returns, relative spreads and adverse
selection spread component. With this approach, no clear eﬀects of BTs
are found. The main result of the study is that there seems to be an increase
in information asymmetries when one looks at the adverse selection spread
component in some of the diﬀerent subsample classiﬁcations (buyer, seller
and sweeping BT), but there is no signiﬁcant permanent eﬀect on returns.
This result could be related to insiders trading in the market. In sharp
contrast with adverse selection evidence, a temporary decrease in bid/ask
spread around BTs is also observed. These changes reﬂect temporary
liquidity eﬀects related to other spread components (order processing
costs and inventory costs).
I. Introduction
Information transmission through order ﬂow is an
important issue in ﬁnancial research. The general
markets eﬃciency assumption is based on this
point. According to theoretical ﬁnancial literature
on information, the value of private information
depreciates quickly (see, for example, Foster and
Viswanathan, 1990). Thus, informed investors prefer
large transactions (Block Trades, or BT henceforth)
in order to get into a valuable position as soon as
possible. Formal models of information disclosure
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0through BTs can be found in Easley and O’Hara
(1987) and Seppi (1990).
1 On the other hand, it is
also known that informed investors, in order to con-
ceal their superior private information, are interested
in camouﬂaging their desired trades into small or
medium size trades (Kyle, 1985). From the empirical
point of view, it is not clear whether these BTs may
be understood as strategic trading motivated by
information or whether they may be viewed only as
a consequence of institutional investors’ balancing
their portfolios.
Most of the empirical research into BTs focuses on
information transmission by looking at permanent
and temporary eﬀects of BTs on asset prices or
returns. The permanent part is interpreted as being
information motivated, whereas the temporary one
is associated with price pressure or liquidity costs.
Kraus and Stoll (1972), Scholes (1972), Holthausen
et al. (1987, 1990), Aggarwal and Chen (1990),
Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), LaPlante and
Muscarella (1997) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997)
are interesting examples of this issue on the NYSE.
Both eﬀects (permanent and temporary) seem to be
present and the sign depends on the type of BT (buyer
or seller). Similar analyses for order driven markets
can be found in Ball and Finn (1989), for the Sidney
Stock Exchange, and Riva (1996), for the Paris
Bourse.
2
This approach must be diﬀerentiated from the one
in the corporate governance literature, in which block
trades are related to publicly announced changes in
the ownership structure of ﬁrms.
3 Some outstanding
references of this alternative literature are Barclay
and Holderness (1991), Bethel et al. (1998) and
Bolton and Von Thadden (1998). Instead of analys-
ing the public announcements of large purchases or
sells of assets, the present focus is in the anonymous
large transactions crossed in the open market.
This study investigates the impact of BTs in the
Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). The SSE oﬀers a
particularly appropriate testing ground for examining
these issues. The reason is that in the open market
period, this type of transaction was not facilitated
as in other markets till 1998, so that BTs were dealt
like small trades.
4 This market microstructure char-
acteristic makes these transactions costly because
of the eﬀort required to cross them. In this way,
the SSE provides a special environment for analys-
ing the information transmission of these speciﬁc
transactions.
In order to analyse whether these transactions
transmit information, a new approach is proposed.
In sharp contrast with previous BT research, it is
assumed that information can be better reﬂected by
changes in true asset value, proxied by the midpoint
of bid-ask best quotes. By looking at these intrinsic
value changes instead of price changes, the eﬀects of
liquidity (noninformative) trades are avoided which
modify asset prices without aﬀecting their true
value (the so-called bid-ask bounce).
5 At the same
time, this allows one to consider very informative
bid-ask changes which do not result from a new
transaction (so that no new price is established),
but which reﬂect worthy changes in the investor’s
preferences for assets. Therefore, the study will
look at changing true asset value orders instead of
trades.
In relation to information eﬀects, two variables are
looked at. As previous studies have done, the impact
of BTs on true asset returns is analysed and a diﬀer-
ent behaviour is expected depending on the type of
BT. Also, as pointed out in market microstructure
literature, changes in the adverse selection spread
component show how prices absorb information.
6
Adverse selection can be understood as a measure
of information asymmetries. Thus, if a decrease in
adverse selection component around BTs is observed,
one could conclude that BTs transmit information
diminishing information asymmetries between agents.
This adverse selection component must be dif-
ferentiated from liquidity in general. Therefore, the
behaviour of relative spreads around BTs will also be
analysed to detect changes in liquidity not related to
information transmission. These changes would be
motivated by order processing costs and inventory
costs.
1Easley and O’Hara (1987) show how BTs signiﬁcantly increase the probability market participants attach to the existence of
private information. Seppi (1990) develops a model where, under not very restricted circumstances, information-based BTs
are traded in a partial-pooling equilibrium.
2Gemmill (1996), for the London Stock Exchange, has recently analysed the liquidity eﬀects of BTs under diﬀerent publica-
tion rules. In related literature, Seppi (1992) and Daley et al. (1995) among others, investigate the extent to which block price
changes around quarterly earnings announcements.
3An anonymous referee is thanked for pointing this out.
4Examples of these special BT devices are the upstairs market in the NYSE (Hasbrouck et al., 1993) and the broader bid-ask
spread in the Paris Bourse (Riva, 1996).
5Seppi (1992) also points out that the conclusions obtained by looking at price changes may be aﬀected by the poten-
tial presence of a variety of price pressure eﬀects.
6See O’Hara (1995).







































































0This new approach is proposed, together with the
special market microstructure that is analysed, makes
this study innovative in current literature on informa-
tion transmission around BTs.
Evidence of information transmission is found
around some types of BTs when one looks at the
adverse selection spread component. However, con-
trary to previous research, no signiﬁcant permanent
eﬀect on true asset returns is found. Changes in
liquidity around BTs are also observed, but this eﬀect
is related to temporary spread components.
The remainder of the article is organized as fol-
lows. Section II reviews brieﬂy the microstructure of
the SSE and, particularly, the block trading process.
The data set and sampling rules are presented in
Section III. Section IV discusses the methodology
used and results obtained in the analysis. Finally,
Section V oﬀers some concluding remarks.
II. Institutional Settings of the
Spanish Stock Market
The electronic continuous market for equities in SSE
is a purely order driven market. Through this system,
142 companies are traded. The main characteristic
is a single order book for every stock. Three main
periods are found in the daily market:
1. Preopening period (from 09:00h to 10:00h): In
this period, introduction, modiﬁcation and can-
cellation of limit orders are allowed. Depending
on supply and demand, the system calculates a
preopening price in real time. At 10:00h the
system assigns shares to orders at prices better
than or equal to the opening price.
2. Open market period (from 10:00h to 17:00h):
During this period limit and market orders are
introduced. If a counterparty is found they are
automatically executed. If not, the order remains
on the book until an incoming order ﬁts it, or
the order is cancelled. In this period, prices
change in real time depending on the ﬂow of
buy and sell orders.
3. Special operations period (from 17:00h to
20:00h): In this period it is possible to report
pre-agreed trades with an eﬀective volume
bigger than 20% of the daily turnover.
In order to identify the information eﬀects of
BTs clearly, the focus will be on the open market
period.
7 In this way, other news is avoided that
could aﬀect the opening asset price during the closed
periods.
As in other markets, an investor willing to buy
or sell a large number of shares looks for a counter-
party through brokerage houses establishing a pre-
agreement in shares and price. However, in order to
cross this preagreement in the open market in SSE,
investors suﬀer two handicaps. First, traders must
introduce a limit order to execute a BT, so it is
impossible to cross it outside the limit order book.
Second, in order to transact the BT, the limit order
must be at the best level of buy or sell prices. As a
result, it can be costly to trade large blocks of shares
in this period.
In this context, a BT trader can face two diﬀerent
market situations: (i) When there is a level of prices
available between best buy and best sell (spread
bigger than tick size), traders quickly introduce
pre-agreed sell and buy limit orders inside the
spread and BT is transacted. (ii) When there is no
such available price and traders do not want to
wait, they sweep the necessary orders to open
the spread and get a price available inside it. This
sweeping activity is particularly necessary for stocks
that are so liquid that it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd an
available price. Obviously, it imposes an additional
cost.
On crossing the two types of BTs, when one side
order has been introduced, there is always the
possibility that another limit order may arrive and
the pre-agreed BT cannot be completely crossed.
8
We call this issue ‘interference risk’.
7During the period analysed, 11% of the total number of BTs was traded in the preopening period, and 15% in the special
operations period. Regarding the eﬀective volume, the percentages are 20% and 16%, respectively.
8Since 6 November 1998, a new device for reporting and trading BTs in the open market period has been operational. This
feature allows market members, as other European markets already do, to trade BTs outside the best bid-ask spread of the
book. In any case, this possibility is set according to a certain relationship with market prices. Speciﬁcally, there are currently
two ways to trade a block: (i) For stocks belonging to the IBEX-35 Index (the 35 most liquid stocks on the SSE), members can
report agreed blocks to the Exchange. As a result, interference risk has been eliminated. Minimum required amount of shares
for trade is 5% of the daily turnover in the last quarter of the year and 100 million pesetas (0.59 million euros). In this context,
the spread is the on line weighted average price of the six best levels of bid and ask. (ii) For all the stocks on the SSE, market
members can introduce orders bigger than 10% of the daily turnover in the last quarter with a deviation of 15% from last
closing price and 250 million pesetas (1.5 million euros). Here there is no time and price priority rule and members can select
any order. Some modiﬁcations regarding the minimum required amount of shares and the price divergence were introduced
on 1 June 2000.








































































Data on all best bid and ask prices on the SSE in the
open market during the one-year period from May
1996 to April 1997 were collected. As indicated, only
quotes that change true asset value were selected
because they reﬂect information arrival appropri-
ately. The cause of these changes is the introduction
of a new limit order that improves one of the best
prices of the limit order book (bid or ask), the can-
cellation of the limit orders that are at these best
levels of prices or a transaction that clears one of
these best positions in the limit order book. The avail-
able information for each of these selected quotes
includes: time (stamped to the nearest second), date,
bid, ask, transaction price and number of shares
transacted since the previous selected quote.
9 The
value of the SSE Index (IBEX-35) for each second
was also obtained from SSE.
As a description of the SSE, Table 1 presents some
summary statistics about the size distribution of all
trades crossed in the SSE during the period consid-
ered. As can be observed, the mean trading volume is
3.4 million pesetas.
10 Trades of 1 million or less repre-
sent more than 60% of all trades, but these trades
only represent 5.9% of eﬀective trading volume.
Throughout this study, BTs are deﬁned as any
trade whose value is over 50 million pesetas and, at
the same time, is greater than 20% of the average
eﬀective trading daily volume for the respective
asset.
11 According to this deﬁnition, there were 2381
BTs during this period. They represent 9.1% of
trading volume, but only 0.06% of the total number
of trades.
Sampling rules
Given that one needs to observe information trans-
mission, some ﬁlters are applied to the sample of BTs
and ﬁrms. The objective of these sample selection
rules is to obtain a sample of BTs that ex-ante were
purely information motivated. First, only BTs invol-
ving the 50 most liquid ﬁrms are considered. This
restriction allows one to use a highly continuous
trading sample. In this way, disturbing nontrading
eﬀects are eliminated. Neither of these ﬁrms has
been implicated in merger or takeover processes
during the period of study. A BT is excluded if
there is a payment or stock split (or any payment in
the ﬁrm) in the 13 calendar-days window for each BT
(six calendar-days before and six calendar-days
after).
12 These BTs are likely to be noninformation-
ally motivated, as Choe and Masoulis (1992) point
out. BTs for which additional blocks occurred in the
stock during the same 13 calendar-days window are
also excluded. In this way, selected BTs are not aﬀec-
ted by the close presence of another BT. For reasons
of data availability (motivated by the estimation
period chosen) BTs occurring less than 14 calendar-
days after the beginning of the period analysed and
14 calendar-days before the end are also excluded.
Finally, only blocks occurring between 11:00h
and 16:00h are analysed. The ﬁrst and the last
hour of the trading day are excluded because of
9For orders that do not produce transactions, the price of the corresponding previous transaction is considered. For the
ﬁrst quote of the day the accumulated volume of shares transacted in the preopening period was used.
10The peseta/euro exchange rate has been 166.386 since 1 January 1999.
11This cut-oﬀ was chosen because it is the institutional requirement for ‘specially communicated trades’ on the SSE.
12There is nothing special in this ﬁgure. The only interest is to separate BT eﬀects as far as possible from others.
Table 1. Size distribution of trades crossed in SSE, May 1996–April 1997
Number of trades Trading volume
<1 mil. 2413137 (60.28) 810396 (5.9)
>1 mil. and <10 mil. 1335059 (33.35) 4348807 (31.6)
>10 mil. and <50 mil. 226666 (5.66) 4435662 (32.2)
>50 mil. 28420 (0.71) 4174179 (30.3)
<5% 22048 (0.55) 2048370 (14.9)
>5% and <10% 2002 (0.05) 421378 (3.1)
>10% and <20% 1989 (0.05) 442291 (3.2)
>20% and <40% 1099 (0.03) 350160 (2.5)
>40% 1282 (0.03) 911980 (6.6)
All trades 4003282 13769044
Notes: Number and eﬀective trading volume (in millions of pesetas) of all trades crossed in the open SSE during the period
May 1996–April 1997, sorted by trading volume. Those with trading volume greater than 50 million are additionally sorted
by their percentage of the average trading daily volume. The percentage of the total is in parentheses.







































































0the disturbing eﬀects of opening and closing trades.
Many large transactions at opening cannot be con-
sidered as BTs: They are merely a large number of
individual transactions crossed together and printed
as one transaction. Likewise, transactions during the
last hour may incorporate end-of-the-day eﬀects (see
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and Harris, 1986).
It must be said that some of the BTs selected
according to these criteria did not appear in the
original sample of quotes changing the asset true
value proxy. However, it was decided to include
them because their information eﬀects could operate
with some delay or advance.
13
After applying all these sampling rules, the number
of BTs ﬁnally considered is reduced to 195, in 41
ﬁrms. They represent 1.3% of the trading volume
during the whole of the period analysed. BT trading
volume ranges from 51 to 27668 million pesetas and
the mean value is about 947 million pesetas.
The analyses will be performed individually for
each BT. The estimation period considered is a
29 calendar-days window for each BT (14 calendar-
days before and 14 calendar-days after BT).
14 It is
clear, considering the diﬀerences between assets,
that the number of quotes in this ﬁxed period is
very diﬀerent from one asset to another. The range
goes from 235 quotes for the least liquid asset to 4460
for the most liquid, with 1487 being the average
number for all BTs in the sample.
Descriptive statistics
Unfortunately, the data set does not identify the
party initiating the large transaction. However, as
is clear from empirical literature on BTs, the
signs of the expected eﬀects diﬀer for buyer and
seller-initiated transactions. A buyer-initiated BT is
expected to produce a permanent increase in the
asset price, whereas the inverse eﬀect is expected for
a seller-initiated BT. In order to sort BTs as buyer or
seller-initiated, the diﬀerence between the BT price
and the true value proxy at the previous trade are
calulated. If this diﬀerence is positive, the BT is
classiﬁed as buyer-initiated, whereas if it is negative
it is classiﬁed as seller-initiated. BTs whose price
equals the previous asset true value are classiﬁed
as indeterminate-initiated.
15
The data set identiﬁes most BTs according to an
inside the spread or sweeping classiﬁcation, as referred
to in Section 2. BTs not included in either of these
types are considered as not classiﬁed.
16 Intuitively,
stronger eﬀects are expected in sweeping BTs because
of the additional cost they impose. BTs were also
sorted by whether or not they change the asset true
value. As above, greater eﬀects in BTs that change
the asset true value were expected. Additionally, BTs
are classiﬁed in four groups according to their trading
volume. Each group has about the same number of
BTs, with BB being the group with the biggest BTs,
SS the group with the smallest, and BS and SB the
medium size group. A direct relationship between
information transmission and BT size was expected.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate some of the distinguishing
features of the BTs in the sample. Table 2 shows the
sample composition regarding the side initiating the
BT, type and changes or not in asset true value.
As can be observed in panel A, the sample distribu-
tion is very similar regarding the side initiating the
BT, especially in the volume transacted. The number
of indeterminate-initiated BTs seems to be greater
than the other types for small and medium BTs.
Panel B shows that the largest BTs by volume trans-
acted are traded inside the spread, whereas the BTs
not classiﬁed seem to be the small ones. However, the
number of BTs in each group is very similar. Panel C
shows that the biggest BTs change the asset true
value. But this relationship is reversed for the other
size BTs.
Table 3 describes the day-of-the-week and hour-of-
the-day distribution of the BT sample. The ﬁrst value
in each cell is the percentage of the number of BTs
and the second is the corresponding trading volume.
A clear seasonal pattern is found in the sample. First,
from the microstructure of the SSE, it is clear that
investors tend to use the less competitive hours of the
day to cross large transactions. It is seen in Table 3
that the 13:00–14:00h period is the time of the trad-
ing day when the biggest BTs are crossed. Diﬀerences
in days of the week are also observed. Surprisingly,
on Friday (the day of the week when futures con-
tracts expire) no special derivatives eﬀect is observed,
13This possibility will be observed when traders choose not to introduce the BT order in the ﬁrst level of book prices. If there
is enough time another order may arrive and when the BT is crossed a change in true asset value will not be observed.
14The estimation period must be long enough to provide precise estimates of parameters and short enough to keep the data
manageable. This period is considered as one that appropriately meets both requirements.
15This criterion has been used previously by Blume et al. (1989) and Hausman et al. (1992), among others. The ‘tick test’
algorithm (which classiﬁes a transaction by looking at the previous transaction’s price) proposed in Lee and Ready (1991),
is a less information consuming, but also less accurate method (see Hausman et al., 1992).
16These are BTs whose limit orders were introduced in the book but not at the ﬁrst level of prices, and which await execution.







































































0whereas a large volume activity is seen during the ﬁrst
part of the week.
IV. Methodology and Results
There are certain features that characterize the data
set. First, quotes are sampled at irregularly spaced
random intervals (whenever changes in true value
occur), so observations are unlikely to be identically
distributed, since some of them are very closely
spaced in time while others may be separated by
hours. Second, asset prices are always quoted in
discrete units or ticks (discreteness). Among the
existing models of stock price discreteness, ordered
probit is the only speciﬁcation that can easily capture
the impact of explanatory variables on price changes
while also accounting for price discreteness and
irregular transaction intervals.
17 However, the use
of an ordered probit speciﬁcation comes up against
a major problem with illiquid stocks. Tick move-
ments must be limited because of the necessary
degrees of freedom in the estimation procedure. So
this method is not useful for the sample.
Therefore, in order to diminish the discreteness
problem, returns will be used instead of prices.
17A description of this estimation procedure can be found in Hausman et al. (1992).
Table 2. Size distribution of the BT sample
BB BS SB SS
N. of
BT (%) Vol. (%)
N. of
BT (%) Vol. (%)
N. of
BT (%) Vol. (%)
N. of
BT (%) Vol. (%)
Panel A
Buyer-init. 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.22 0.33
Seller-init. 0.39 0.45 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.16 0.34
Indeterminate-init. 0.26 0.23 0.49 0.35 0.50 0.30 0.61 0.33
Panel B
Inside the spread 0.47 0.76 0.34 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.39
Sweeping 0.31 0.20 0.33 0.43 0.32 0.40 0.31 0.53
Not classiﬁed 0.22 0.04 0.33 0.08 0.33 0.13 0.39 0.08
Panel C
Change in true asset value 0.67 0.65 0.47 0.35 0.51 0.35 0.52 0.37
No change in true asset value 0.33 0.35 0.53 0.65 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.63
Note: Size distribution of the sample in number of BTs and trading volume (in percentage terms). Regarding trading volume,
BTs are classiﬁed in four groups, including the biggest in BB and the smallest in SS. In panel A, BTs are classiﬁed according to
the side of the market initiating the BTs (buyer, seller or indeterminate initiated), in panel B they are classiﬁed according to
type (inside the spread, sweeping or not classiﬁed) and in panel C according to whether they change the asset true value or not.
Table 3. Daily and hourly seasonality of the BT sample
Mon. (%) Tue. (%) Wed. (%) Thu. (%) Fri. (%) All days (%)
11:00–12:00 5.64 5.64 3.59 2.05 1.03 17.95
6.81 3.17 1.96 0.86 0.18 12.96
12:00–13:00 6.15 8.72 4.10 3.59 6.15 28.72
5.45 7.63 2.11 3.94 2.45 21.58
13:00–14:00 4.62 4.10 5.64 1.54 6.15 22.05
7.79 7.98 17.84 1.20 3.89 38.71
14:00–15:00 2.05 6.67 2.05 1.54 6.15 18.46
0.51 12.10 1.43 0.43 1.29 15.75
15:00–16:00 2.56 3.59 2.05 2.56 2.05 12.82
1.43 4.25 2.56 2.40 0.36 10.99
All periods 21.03 28.72 17.44 11.28 21.54
21.99 35.13 25.91 8.82 8.16
Note: Day-of-the-week and hour-of-the-day distributions (in percentages terms) of the BT sample. The ﬁrst value in each cell
is the percentage of the number of blocks and the second one is the corresponding trading volume.







































































0Furthermore, to solve the irregular random intervals
problem, two alternative speciﬁcations will be used:
the use of diﬀerences in time between consecutive
quotes as an explanatory variable and the use of a
time adjustment for the exogenous and endogenous
variables.
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the vari-
ables that is focused on is changes in true asset value.
The true value idea is taken from market microstruc-
ture literature. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) advocate
the use of the midpoint of bid-ask prices as a proxy
for the true value. For asset j, the true value after the





where Ajk and Bjk are the ask and bid prices of asset
j on the kth quote, respectively. The point here is
that if large trades convey valuable information,
agents revise their estimation of the true price and
their subsequent orders will modify the book quotes.
These modiﬁcations are considered informative
(whether or not there is a new transaction), because
they represent changes in the amount investors are
willing to pay or to receive for assets. Continuously
compounded returns of relative change in the true
value proxy are used as the information variable.
This variable will be denoted by Rjk.
In addition to information transmission, BTs can
involve temporary changes in liquidity. The idea is
that BTs can aﬀect investors’ optimal portfolio or
related variables and impose an inventory cost.
These liquidity eﬀects of BTs are analysed with
regard to changes in relative spread. Many market
microstructure articles focus on relative spread to
study liquidity eﬀects around dividend or earning
announcements.
18 The relative spread for asset j after
the kth quote is denoted by Sjk, and is deﬁned by:
Sjk ¼
Ajk   Bjk
ðAjk þ BjkÞ=2
ð2Þ
Additionally, it is considered that BTs can aﬀect
some variables such as accumulated volume and dif-
ferences in time between quotes. Some papers have
shown that it is important to control for some activity
variables when one wants to measure the information
ﬂow. As Seppi (1992) indicates, when BTs are
looked at one should consider a proxy of activity.
One conclusion of market microstructure literature
is that market activity can be measured by trading
volume. In this way, volume appears as one appro-
priate variable reﬂecting information arrival.
19 This is
denoted by VOLjk, the square root of accumulated
number of shares traded on asset j between quotes
k 1 and k.
20 This is denoted further as Diftjk, the
square root of the time elapsed in seconds between
quotes k 1 and k on asset j.
21 Engle and Lange
(1997) show that this variable can signal changes in
the order ﬂow regime. So one also looks at these
variables, looking for changes in regime around BTs.
Preliminary evidence of BT eﬀects on previous
variables is shown in Table 4. This table shows
percentage changes in relative spread, diﬀerences in
time and accumulated volume dividing each observa-
tion by its average along the estimation period by







where C stands for S, Dift and VOL. For returns one
uses the statistic:
Kjk ¼ Rjk   Rj ð4Þ
The average of these statistics across all BTs is
calculated for 10 quotes just before and after them.
The cross-sectional distribution of each average
is used to study the signiﬁcant level of the event.
We can observe diﬀerent evidence in Table 4. First,
relative spreads seem to decrease before and after
BTs. This indicates an increase in liquidity. This eﬀect
is especially important just after BTs. According to
market microstructure theory, this reduction may be
caused by a reduction in information asymmetries or
trading cost. No signiﬁcant variation is observed in
returns around BTs, but there is a decrease in volume
before BTs that could indicate that agents are waiting
for BTs to arrive. The only abnormal volume is the
next BT quote. This could be a sign of agents updat-
ing their demands and portfolios. The positive and
signiﬁcant numbers found in time diﬀerences show
that time between quotes increases just before
and after a BT. Again, this could be an indication
of investors waiting for trading and updating
their expectations. However, this evidence is contrary
to insider trading behaviour, as shown in Engle and
18Lee et al. (1993) and Rubio and Tapia (1996) are representative examples of this literature.
19Previous research (Lee et al. (1993) for the NYSE and Rubio and Tapia (1996) for the SSE) has found clear eﬀects of
trade volume on relative spread. Therefore, volume will be considered as a control variable.
20The square root is used to avoid the outlier problem.
21When a change of day occurs, the time from the market opening is used.







































































0Lange (1997) and theoretical papers that indicate
that insiders would use noisy trading intervals to
camouﬂage their trades. So the preliminary evidence
around BTs shows diﬀerent behaviour of relevant
variables such as spreads, volume and diﬀerences
in time.
However, the observed eﬀects on the variables may
be due to variables aﬀecting them other than BT
information transmission. In order to isolate the BT
eﬀect, one needs to control the endogenous variables
considered for alternative inﬂuential variables around
BTs. The control variables used are well known in
ﬁnancial literature.
As has been pointed out, volume appears to be one
appropriate control variable for information arrival.
Therefore, VOL is used as an independent variable in
the regression analysis. Three lags of this variable
are considered in order to allow for some delay in
its eﬀects. In order to avoid the disturbing overnight
eﬀect, one also considers an end-of-the-day dummy
variable.
22 This variable, denoted by Dend, is taken
as 1 if the kth quote on asset j is the ﬁrst quote of the
day and 0 otherwise. Market return is also taken into
account as an exogenous variable. The IBEX-35
Index is taken as the market index. The nearest in
seconds value is taken for each quote in the sample
period. Its return is denoted by RIBEX. Three lags of
this variable are also used in order to allow for some
delay in its eﬀects. The aforementioned Dift is also
considered as a control variable.
Finally, to pick up eﬀects around BTs, 21 dummy
variables are considered (a window of 10 quotes
before and after each BT) denoted by DBT . Each
dummy is given a value of 1 for the quote occurring
  quotes after the BT, and 0 otherwise. The quote
corresponding to the BT itself is considered as the
reference quote,   ¼0. So, after controlling by the
aforementioned variables, the coeﬃcients of these
dummy variables will show us the eﬀect of BTs on
the endogenous variables before and after they occur.
As pointed out in the introduction, three diﬀerent
endogenous variables are considered: true asset
22It has been well documented that overnight returns diﬀer substantially from intraday returns (Amihud and Mendelson,
1987 and Stoll and Whaley, 1990).
Table 4. Preliminary evidence of BT eﬀects
Sjk Diftjk VOLjk Rjk   Rj
 10 2.77 16.69  25.43* 0.41E-05
 9 5.55  10.11  2.45  1.33E-05
 8 1.56 3.74  24.02*  6.93E-05
 7  1.93 8.00  26.50**  2.53E-05
 6 0.63 9.03  22.09* 2.90E-05
 5  7.28 58.39* 8.67  4.65E-05
 4  4.31 28.65*  2.13 0.76E-05
 3  13.44* 101.36* 4.41  3.78E-05
 2  5.11 74.35* 42.44**  0.67E-05
 1  25.45* 118.87* 35.92  4.13E-05
0  5.18 44.52* 5793.02*  3.66E-05
1 2.13 75.39* 316.71* 1.62E-05
2  6.98 54.37* 20.57  3.72E-05
3  6.33 53.76*  14.70 1.17E-05
4  5.88 58.32*  0.27  4.51E-05
5  9.77* 56.42* 4.92 0.04E-05
6  10.71* 56.35*  12.53  6.79E-05
7  13.75* 28.21**  16.45  3.28E-05
8  11.41* 51.11* 3.71  3.25E-05
9  11.26* 53.99* 42.33**  6.29E-05
10  6.82 22.16 16.56 2.12E-05
Note: For the characteristics of relative spread, diﬀerences in time and accumulated volume, it is shown the percentage







where Cj is the average of each characteristic along the estimation period. For returns the statistic: Kjk ¼ Rjk   Rj is used.
The asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at 5% and double asterisk at 10%.







































































0returns, relative spreads and adverse selection spread
component. They capture price, liquidity and infor-
mation transmission eﬀects respectively. Because no
two ﬁrms have an identical timing of quotes, regres-
sions cannot be estimated as a multivariate system
across all BTs, so one time-series regression is run
for each BT. The coeﬃcients are therefore averaged
over all of them and over the diﬀerent subsamples
considered. If BTs are relevant for these variables,
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients will be observed for the appro-
priate BT dummy variables. These are the relevant
variables in the analysis. The remaining variables
are included only to control for external eﬀects.
Returns evidence
Next, the regression are shown for each BT used
to analyse the BT eﬀects on true asset returns. The
time-series regression for each BT j is:
Rk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  R  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0
  RIBEX  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0
  VOL 
þ  Dift þ ’Dend þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  DBT  þ !k ð5Þ
where three lags of the endogenous variable are used
and DBT stands for the dummy variable employed to
pick up eﬀects around BTs.
23
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows the results of
the above regressions. Only the results for the total
sample of BTs are reported. First, one observes
mean reversion in returns. This expected result is con-
sistent with other results in related literature. Second,
clock time measured by Dift is also signiﬁcant. Other
control variables seem relevant and coeﬃcient signs
are as expected (RIBEX, VOL, Dend). So the use of
these variables to control seems to be justiﬁed.
Next, the closest BT dummy coeﬃcients are shown.
In general, they are not statistically signiﬁcant. The
contemporary coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant.
The most striking result is that in the diﬀerent
subsample classiﬁcations this coeﬃcient does not
change its sign or is not statistically relevant.
24 This
is especially important in the buyer and seller classi-
ﬁcation. This is not consistent with previous BT stu-
dies or with intuition. In the total sample results, this
negative eﬀect of the contemporaneous BT dummy is
almost oﬀset by the eﬀect of two quotes later. In the
end, it seems that there is no signiﬁcant permanent
eﬀect on returns. The reason for this result could be
the speciﬁc problems that traders face in the SSE in
crossing a BT. These problems could cause the BT
price not to be the real price. The idea is that inves-
tors willing to buy (sell) a BT would pay (renounce)
an additional fee that is not observed by market
participants. In this environment, BT prices might
not be informative.
Alternatively in order to control for irregular
interval problem, time returns are also calculated
according to the expression:
TARk ¼ð 1 þ RkÞ
1=Diftk
hi
  1 ð6Þ
The analogous regressions now run for each BT
are:
TARk ¼  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  TAR  þ




X  ¼ 3
 ¼0




  DBT  þ !k ð7Þ
where TARIBEX is calculated in the same way as
TAR, whereas TAVOL is VOL divided by Dift.
With this speciﬁcation, the results are slightly
diﬀerent. In general, the control variables are not rele-
vant or their coeﬃcients are lower than before, and
BT dummies are not signiﬁcant. Although one cannot
construct a statistical test to evaluate the appropriate-
ness of time adjustment, by looking at adjusted R
squared one can conclude that, in general, adjustment
with Dift as an exogenous variable is better than TAR
adjustment. This is why these results are not included.
Adverse selection evidence
To test the information transmission hypothesis, the
adverse selection spread component is looked at. The
way in which we estimate this component is taken
from Foster and Viswanathan (1993). These authors
measure adverse selection as the returns response to
unexpected volume. Given their model, the following
time series regressions are estimated for each BT:
VOLk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  R  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  VOL  þ  Dift
þ ’Dend þ !k ð8Þ
Rk ¼   þ  !k þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  !kDBT  þ uk ð9Þ
23The range of selected quotes for each regression goes from 235 to 4460. The study ran 195 regressions.
24The subsample results can be obtained from the authors by request.







































































0Table 5. Aggregate results
R Adverse selection VOL S
CONS 1.56E-05 0.62E-05 13.49* 0.00*
R( 1)  0.32* – – –
R( 2)  0.07* – – –
R( 3)  0.04* – – –
RIBEX 0.40* – – –
RIBEX( 1) 0.16* – – –
RIBEX( 2) 0.10* – – –
RIBEX( 3) 0.05* – – –
VOL 0.13E-05* – –  2.41E-05*
VOL( 1) 0.00E-05 – 0.02* 1.59E-05*
VOL( 2)  0.02E-05 – 0.06* 0.42E-05*
VOL( 3)  0.02E-05 – 0.04* 0.07E-05*
S( 1) – – – 0.40*
S( 2) – – – 0.22*
S( 3) – – – 0.05*
Dift  0.47E-05* – 1.36*  0.17E-05*
Dend 52.49E-05* – 64.22* 0.00*
  – 0.00E-05 – –
 5 1.55E-05  0.01E-05  2.93  4.41E-05
 4 8.82E-05 0.38E-05 2.86 8.45E-05
 3  7.31E-05  0.04E-05  1.99  24.0E-05
 2  17.42E-05  0.03E-05 9.79* 26.2E-05
 1 3.82E-05 0.51E-05  8.01*  55.5E-05*
0  72.46E-05*  0.08E-05 348.24*  0.00*
1  11.36E-05 0.01E-05 4.38  29.8E-05
2 58.36E-05* 5.64E-05  26.57*  12.2E-05
3  8.64E-05 0.75E-05  19.45* 31.1E-05**
4 19.33E-05 0.07E-05**  5.95* 18.7E-05
5  13.33E-05  0.02E-05  2.43*  4.79E-05
Notes: For each BT in the sample, three time series regressions are run with three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In particular the
regressions are:
Rk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  R  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0
  RIBEX  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0
  VOL 
þ  Dift þ ’Dend þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  DBT  þ !k
Sk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  S  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0




  DBT  þ !k
VOLk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  VOL  þ  Dift þ ’Dend þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  DBT  þ !k
where RIBEX is the return of IBEX-35, VOL is the square root of accumulated volume between quotes changing asset true
value, Dift is the square root of time elapsed between quotes, Dend is a dummy variable for end-of-the-day eﬀects and DBT
stands for the dummy variable employed to pick up eﬀects around BTs. To test the BT eﬀects on the adverse selection spread
component two time series regressions are run with two diﬀerent speciﬁcations:
VOLk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  R  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  VOL  þ  Dift þ ’Dend þ !k
Rk ¼   þ  !k þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  !kDBT  þ uk
The coeﬃcients are averaged across all BTs. White (1980) standard errors are used.







































































0The ﬁrst equation estimates the unexpected volume
for each change in true return through residuals. The
second equation measures the reaction of returns
including as explanatory variables these residuals and
BT dummies. In this context, coeﬃcient   measures
mean adverse selection and coeﬃcient   measures
abnormal adverse selection around BTs. Aggregate
results are included in the second column of Table 5.
It can be observed that the adverse selection com-
ponent, measured as the coeﬃcient of residuals, is
not signiﬁcant. The only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is the
one associated withfourquotesafterBT.Theseresults
are consistent with the Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988)
model where liquidity traders pool their trades.
So insiders only act in these periods and not in the
middle of the day, when they would be detected.
So, BTs are not as informative as expected.
Table 6 looks at diﬀerent subsample classiﬁcations.
The results are slightly diﬀerent. The contemporary
BT dummy is signiﬁcantly positive for buyer and seller
BTs but not for indeterminate BTs. This is consistent
with the sign of the initiator party. The same dummy
is also signiﬁcant and positive in sweeping BTs.
This result is also consistent because of the additional
cost this type of BTs imposes. Finally, a signiﬁcant
positive contemporary BT dummy is also found for
no-changing-true-asset-value BTs. This coeﬃcient
may be justiﬁed by the ignorance of investors about
the eﬀects of this type of BT. These results are indica-
tive of information transmission. There exists an
Table 6. Adverse selection evidence in subsample classiﬁcations
Buyer-init. Seller-init. Indeterminate-init. Inside the spread Sweeping Not classiﬁed
CONS  4.69E-06 9.02E-06 1.07E-05 1.15E-05 9.20E-07 1.52E-05
  4.16E-09 4.64E-09 1.19E-09  1.31E-09  3.10E-12 4.16E-08**
 5  8.85E-07 1.73E-07 1.14E-07 8.59E-07 2.92E-07  7.55E-06**
 4 5.27E-06  2.14E-07 5.39E-06 3.73E-06 4.55E-06  2.13E-07
 3 7.32E-07  1.95E-06*  8.77E-08 4.66E-07  4.53E-07  3.94E-06*
 2  8.34E-08  1.35E-07  4.20E-07  1.55E-07  1.18E-07  1.61E-06
 1  1.87E-05  5.33E-07 2.17E-05** 1.01E-05  9.44E-06 7.47E-05
0 4.11E-06* 1.79E-06*  5.02E-06  6.44E-06 2.65E-06* 3.99E-06
1  1.66E-07  9.73E-07 9.00E-07 1.27E-06  5.80E-07  9.08E-07
2 2.69E-06 5.76E-08 1.19E-04 1.42E-04 1.46E-06 1.76E-06
3  9.93E-07 3.98E-07 1.65E-05 1.97E-05  3.24E-08  1.60E-06
4 5.92E-07 1.16E-06 5.44E-07 4.45E-07 7.41E-07 1.95E-06
5 3.49E-09  6.53E-07  6.29E-08  8.57E-08 4.11E-09  2.13E-06





CONS 3.18E-05* 6.66E-06  2.70E-05* 1.27E-05 1.17E-05**  9.93E-07
  1.89E-09  3.22E-09 1.12E-08 1.91E-09 5.17E-09  1.02E-10
 5 2.24E-07  1.01E-06 2.92E-07  2.37E-08 3.42E-08  3.49E-07
 4 4.15E-06  2.78E-06 5.99E-06 8.04E-06 4.19E-06 3.37E-06
 3 1.09E-07  5.66E-07  1.02E-06  5.82E-08  2.55E-07  5.47E-07
 2  3.66E-07  2.71E-07  7.65E-07 3.73E-07  2.02E-07  3.24E-07
 1  1.14E-06** 5.61E-06 2.45E-05  8.22E-06 1.06E-05  2.25E-06
0 1.32E-06 9.50E-07  7.30E-06 1.77E-06  3.81E-06 3.21E-06*
1 1.45E-08 2.78E-06*  9.08E-07  1.46E-06 7.80E-07  7.70E-07
2  3.63E-07 4.11E-06 3.76E-06 2.17E-04 9.77E-05 1.82E-06
3 3.90E-07* 4.00E-07  1.41E-06 3.06E-05 1.30E-05 3.07E-07**
4 1.59E-07  4.12E-08 7.95E-07 1.99E-06 4.36E-07 1.11E-06
5 1.72E-08  1.28E-08  8.28E-07  1.29E-08  3.62E-07 6.75E-10
Notes: For each BT in the sample, two time series regressions are run:
VOLk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  R  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  VOL  þ  Dift þ ’Dend þ !k
Rk ¼   þ  !k þ
X  ¼10
 ¼ 10
  !kDBT  þ uk
where VOL is the square root of accumulated volume between quotes changing asset true value, Dift is the square root of
time elapsed between quotes, Dend is a dummy variable for end-of-the-day eﬀects and DBT stands for the dummy variable
employed to pick up eﬀects around BTs. The coeﬃcients are averaged across all of them. White (1980) standard errors
are used.







































































0increase in adverse selection spread component for
these subsamples. These results are consistent with the
presence of insiders trading with orders of these types.
It seems that the knowledge of the BT initiator party
increases information asymmetries among traders.
Moreover, the implied greater cost of sweeping BT
seems to be a signal of the quality of the information
transmitted to the market. Additionally, information
asymmetries among traders increase with BTs that do
not change the true asset value.
As a last test of information transmission, volume
is considered as an endogenous variable. Volume will
measure abnormal activity around BTs. In this case,
this would be a signal of insiders around BTs and
information ﬂow in the market.
25 The regressions
for each BT are:
VOLk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1




  DBT  þ !k ð10Þ
Results are in the third column of Table 5. Before
the BT one sees an unclear pattern, with a negative
coeﬃcient just before the BT but a positive one two
quotes before. However, after BTs there is a signiﬁ-
cant decrease in market activity that could be related
to the presence of insiders. Those insiders could lead
the rest of market participants to decrease transacted
volume. This is associated with previous ﬁndings on
adverse selection.
Liquidity evidence
For relative spread, Sk, the time-series regression run
for each BT is shown by the following expression:
Sk ¼   þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼ 1
  S  þ
X  ¼ 3
 ¼0




  DBT  þ !k ð11Þ
The results are shown in the last column of Table 5.
The lagged variables are positive and signiﬁcant. As
expected, an autorregresive process is observed in
this variable. Another important variable is volume.
A negative contemporaneous coeﬃcient and positive
lagged ones are observed. A negative relationship
has been documented in other research into the
SSE (Rubio and Tapia, 1996). This evidence is also
consistent with Admati and Pﬂeiderer’s (1988) model
and, at the same time, is contrary to the results of Lee
et al. (1993) for the US market.
The most important result related to liquidity is the
negative and signiﬁcant BT dummy coeﬃcients just
before and contemporary with BT arrival. This is
related to an increase in liquidity. The increase in
liquidity before BT can be explained by the necessary
introduction of pre-agreed BT limit orders for the
same amount of shares at the price available inside
the spread. After BTs there is a decrease in liquidity,
so part of the eﬀect is temporary. This result is related
to a decrease in temporary spread components such
as inventory cost and operative cost. This is relevant
because these coeﬃcients have been obtained by
taking volume into account as a control variable.
Looking at the SSE, this is a stronger result because
previous research did not ﬁnd any eﬀect on relative
spread after controlling for volume.
26
V. Concluding Remarks
To the best of knowledge, this study analyses for the
ﬁrst time the role of BTs in a market where this issue
is not facilitated. This market microstructure charac-
teristic gives us a special testing ground. Additionally,
quotes are used that change true asset value instead
of prices.
Three diﬀerent eﬀects around BTs are studied:
price, liquidity and information transmission. To
capture them, three diﬀerent endogenous variables
are considered: true asset returns, relative spreads
and adverse selection spread component. With this
approach, there are no clear eﬀects of BTs.
There is no signiﬁcant permanent eﬀect on returns
in the diﬀerent subsample classiﬁcation, which is
contrary to previous evidence and to our intuition.
In related papers, other authors have obtained clear
eﬀects of BTs on prices depending on BT type. One
suspects that the reasons for these diﬀerences could
be related to methodology and SSE market micro-
structure. To discover the source of these diﬀerences,
this methodology should be applied to other markets
with block trading facilities.
In addition to previous studies, adverse selection is
analysed as a measure of information asymmetries
and, as a consequence, of information transmission.
It seems that there is an increase in information asym-
metries when one look at adverse selection spread
25See Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988).
26Rubio and Tapia (1996) show that relative spreads do not change in the SSE around dividend announcements when they
control for activity variables such as volume and number of transactions.







































































0component in the diﬀerent subsample classiﬁcations
(buyer, seller, sweeping and not-changing-true-asset-
value BTs). This result could be related to insiders
trading in the market.
In sharp contrast with adverse selection evidence,
one also observes a temporary increase in liquidity
around BTs. These changes reﬂect temporary liquid-
ity eﬀects related to other spread components (order
processing costs and inventory costs). This opposite
evidence could be explained by the fact that there are
no special market participants such as specialists or
dealers and as a result our market participants are
not required to absorb temporary order imbalances.
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